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The Myth of Discovery
Claire A. Hill
1. INTRODUCTION
Economists are increasingly concluding that their
simplifying assumptions about preferences are too simple.
In particular, the idea that preferences might be
constructed rather than fixed is being explored. In this
companion piece to my more detailed consideration of
this subject, I argue that what makes the assumption of
fixed preferences possible is a myth, the myth of
discovery-that preferences exist to be discovered. Once
we acknowledge that preferences are as much made as
found, and that the raw materials from which they are
made are scarcely stable, the assumption of fixed
preferences becomes far less tenable. My exposition
proceeds through a discussion of a recent book arguing
that choice is not all it is cracked up to be, Barry
Schwartz's The Paradox of Choice.'
2. (HOW) CAN TOO MUCH CHOICE BE BAD?
In The Paradox of Choice, Barry Schwartz argues that
more choice can be bad. Schwartz's narrative reads as
though he arrived at this view from his own experience.
When Schwartz was in college, he found it easy to buy
jeans. He would go to the store, pick out a pair of jeans in
his size, and buy them. Recently, he went to buy jeans.
The salesperson at the store offered him "slim-fit, easy fit,
relaxed fit, baggy, extra baggy . . ., stonewashed, acid-
washed, distressed . . ., button-fly, zipper-fly . . ., faded or
regular? ' 2 He was forced to attend to intricacies and
permutations he had never imagined. Perhaps worse still,
Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law and Rationality,
University of Minnesota School of Law. Thanks to Jim Chen, Tyler
Cowen, Phil Curry, Andrew Guzman, Peter Huang, George Loewenstein,
Art Markman, Brett McDonnell, Fred Schauer, Barry Schwartz, Michael
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1 .BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS 2 (2004)2 1 Id.
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he was filled with doubt as to what he wanted. And it is
not as though when he got home with his more carefully
chosen jeans he realized what he had been missing in
college. The whole experience was a big waste of time
from start to finish.
There are many reasons why Schwartz's story might
not have a message that is generally applicable. Though
these increments do not matter to him, they may matter
to other people. After all, I know people who say they
"eat to live," and are quite indifferent about the taste of
food. (I will admit that I do not know many such people.
Okay, one.) Schwartz may be idiosyncratic in not caring
about various kinds of differences. Or he may simply
have gotten the wrong jeans. The perfect pair of jeans for
him may exist, but his impatience (and, maybe, his
general obliviousness) prevented him from finding them
(and might have prevented him from appreciating the
difference between the pair he acquired and the pair he
could have acquired). How many people are like
Schwartz, or at least enough like him in this respect that
his conclusion follows in any meaningful sense? Are
enough people happier with the multi-jean selection than
the single-jean selection that the waste of time by
Schwartz and his ilk (including the cost of not having the
books he would otherwise have been able to write had he
not been choosing jeans) is a worthwhile price to pay?
A response one might make to this line of argument-
and that many commentators have made 3 -is that an
objection to more choice is ridiculous. People can just
limit the choices available to them by adopting some sort
of decision rule. Moreover, market mechanisms exist to
help people choose. Consider, for instance, the Michelin
restaurant guide, Consumer Reports, or even the ratings
on Amazon.com. And, even if Schwartz is right, what
follows? 4 That we should limit others' choices because
3 . See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Multitudes in the Valley of Decision,
REASON ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2004,
http://www.reason.com/news/show/34754.html; Charles Paul Freund,
Option Overload, REASON ONLINE, Apr. 2004, http://www. reason.com/news/
show/29084.html; Virginia Postrel, I'm Pro-Choice, FORBES, Mar. 28, 2005.
But see Kevin Cheng, Choosing to Give Choices, OK/CANCEL, June 3, 2005,
http://www.ok-cancel.com/archives/article/2005/06/choosing-to-give-
choices.html (discussing the pros and cons of limiting choice in user
interface design for computer software and websites).
4 .And indeed, one commentator suggests that some objections
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Schwartz finds choosing unpleasant and not worthwhile?
Certainly, Schwartz would not advocate any such
thing, except perhaps in very limited spheres with a
strong public interest.5  Indeed, his main policy
prescription, if what he recommends warrants that label,
is one that economists would not have difficulties with:
that individuals need to develop a strategy to deal with
the multitude of choices around them, and with
made to Schwartz's position may instead be to what might be thought
to follow. See Posting of Michael to 2Blowhards,
http://www.2blowhards.com/archives/O0207 1.html (June 16, 2005)(arguing that objections to Schwartz's view are motivated by an implicit
and illicit move to the policy considerations thought to flow from it).
The discussion here [on another blog the poster refers to]
seems to be set up as an either/or: you're either for more
consumer choice, or you're a statist asshole who wants to
Stalinize everyone else's life ...
But why can't we take another tack entirely? Why not recognize
that some if not many people-OK, maybe not you specifically-
sometimes do find it more than a little bewildering to be living
in such consumer cornucopia conditions? Why shouldn't
stopping at this point for a few seconds not be legit? Why notjust discuss what we (or many other people) find contempo [sic]
life to be like without instantly advancing to the policy-decision
stage?
I think there's lots of value in pausing over the "what it's like"
part of the discussion before roaring ahead into the "what must
be done" part .... If the free market is about being able to
participate as you want-well, when you're feeling blurry and
confused (ie., [sic] overwhelmed by huge amounts of choice),
how do you figure out what you want?
Id. One objection certainly fits this characterization. See Bailey, supra
note 3.
One suspects that [Schwartz's] unspoken [view] is that sound
public policy consists of the government restricting options and
forcing Americans to do what people like Professor Schwartz
think is good for them. Such choice-restricting policies have
included Prohibition, the drug war, wage-price controls, publicly
financed education, bankrupt Social Security and Medicare
systems, and the soon-to-be-launched war on obesity, among
others.
Id.
Retirement savings plans might be an example. See generally
Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral Finance for
Retirement Plan Design, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE. (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, eds., 2004). See
also George Loewenstein, Costs and Benefits of Health and Retirement
Related Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE: INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE RISK AND
RESPONSIBILITY. (Sheila Burke et al., eds., 2000). Also, consider the work of
Richard Thaler, Daniel Kahneman, Terence Odean, Cass Sunstein, and
others on the extent to which people trade too much, make bad
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information "overload" more broadly.6 Schwartz argues
that "satisficing," choosing something "good enough," is a
far better idea than "maximizing," holding out for the best
possible thing. Interestingly, psychologists Ketalaar &
Clore argue that the feeling of falling in love has precisely
this intention-to make people choose something "good
enough" rather than endlessly seeking perfection.7
Schwartz differs with his critics in being far more
sympathetic to the choice-impaired. His critics may think
that people who do not develop strategies for dealing with
too many choices have only themselves to blame. They
also may very well believe that the market will take care
of the problem, creating a new niche for those who can
reduce information flow to manageable sizes. Yes, there
may be a transition period as the market develops the
necessary expertise-but, in the long run, the problem will
be properly solved. We will have the advantages of more
choice without the disadvantages. Schwartz presumably
would not rule out that in the long run, and maybe even in
the moderate run, the winnowing-down market niche may
be filled. He would disagree with the economists, though,
as to how soon it would be filled, and the costs along the
way, and how successful the fillers will be.
The main thrust of Schwartz's argument is empirical.
He cites experimental evidence to support the proposition
that more choice causes less happiness and more
anxiety,8 and sometimes, fewer purchases, as people give
choices, have greater difficulties in the face of more options, etc.
Literature under the general rubric of "libertarian paternalism" or "the
new paternalism" also argues that attempts to influence and perhaps
limit choice may be a good thing, using reasoning that Schwartz might
very well find congenial. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AMER. ECON. REV. 175 (2003).
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). But see
Claire A Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 444 (2007)(appraising and critiquing the libertarian/new paternalists' arguments).
6 Consider in this regard some headings from the last part of The
Paradox of Choice: "1. Choose When to Choose," "3. Satisfice More and
Maximize Less," "7. Regret Less," "10. Curtail Social Comparison," and
"11. Learn to Love Constraints." SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 221-36.
7 .Timothy Ketelaar, & Gerald Clore, Emotions and Reason:
Proximate Effects and Ultimate Functions, in PERSONALITY, EMOTION, AND
COGNITIVE SCIENCE 355 (G. Matthews ed., 1997).
8 One might think, to the contrary, that having more choices make
people happy. But some evidence suggests otherwise. More money
gives people more choices. But some research demonstrates that
individuals who unexpectedly get wealth (e.g., by winning the lottery)
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in to paralysis. 9 Somebody sympathetic to Schwartz's
argument might think that it is a good thing that Schwartz
relies on the empirics. How can anybody possibly argue
as a matter of theory that more choice sometimes is not
good?10
In fact, such an argument follows from the increasing
recognition that preferences are not as neoclassical
economists have hypothesized them to be. Neoclassical
economists use (believe in?) the rational choice model.
The rational choice model assumes and requires that
preferences are stable, determinate, coherent and
invariant to mode of elicitation."' The appropriate rhetoric
is therefore one of discovery: when people make choices,
they are "revealing" their preferences. More colloquially,
as to any object x, a person knows how she ranks it
relative to some other objects y and z and she is
consistent in her ranking. A banana? Better than an apple
but worse than an orange. And confronted with a choice
quickly return to their pre-winning level of happiness. See, e.g.,
Timothy D. Wilson et al., Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional
Evanescence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL
BEING 209 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003).
9 . Anecdotal evidence abounds for the phenomena Schwartz is
describing. See, e.g., Ellen Warren, Choose or Lose: Too Many Options
at the Big Box Stores? Indecisive Shopping Online? We're Here to Help,
CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2005, at 4.
"Don't go in there!" the paint store man warned me as I headed
for a large alcove labeled "Custom Color Center" at J.C. Licht
Co. in Oak Park.
This after I told him I was getting freaked out by too many
choices.
Was he ever right. I should have never even started looking at
all those paint chips. Did you know that there are at least 175
different shades of white paint? And that's from just one
manufacturer. I counted them.
And the bottom line: I have five different rooms in five different
shades of white. And you know what? You couldn't tell the
difference with a microscope.
Id.
10 Note that this formulation glosses over well-known ways within
the traditional neoclassical account in which less choice can sometimes
be beneficial, such as a strategy of pre-commitment. But the
neoclassical account assumes that more choice should be good except
when, under particular circumstances, it is not. My argument disputes
the worldview embedded in this assumption.
11 See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON LIT. 11(1998) [hereinafter Rabin, Psychology]; GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976).
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between the banana and the orange, she will always take
the orange. 12 And as between the orange and the apple,
she will always take the orange. 3 But scholars outside
the field of economics, and increasing numbers of
economists, believe that preferences are constructed as
they are elicited.14 Preferences are as much created as
discovered.
What does it mean to say that preferences are
constructed? How are preferences constructed? What
determines someone's preferences? At this point, no
detailed account has been formulated, much less one that
commands a consensus. 15 Clearly, there is no formula by
which preferences can reliably be influenced, as was
conjured up in the 1960's era critiques of Madison Avenue
(and corporate America more broadly). 16 In such critiques,
12 While the model speaks as though it does not formally take into
account getting sick of something you have had a lot of, economists are
of course sensible enough to acknowledge that after the fifth banana,
you might choose an apple, and have a formal term for this
phenomenon, declining marginal utility.
13 . A series of well-known experiments has demonstrated violations
of this principle. See Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, in CHOICES,
VALUES AND FRAMES 597 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
(discussing one important such experiment); Claire A. Hill, The
Rationality of Preference Construction (and the Irrationality of Rational
Choice), 9 MINN. J.L. So. & TECH. 689, 700 (2008).
14 . Hill, supra note 13, at 704 n.52 (discussing some of the
literature on the topic).
15 . Even the economists' model could address the question of how
preferences are determined. Thinking preferences are fixed does not
exclude being interested in how they come to be as they are. But
instead, economists hypothesize a black box (de gustibus non est
disputandum). There may be some evolutionary determinants, and
there are, colloquially, some canonically preferred things (money and
power, most notably). Mostly, however, the issue is deemed to be
outside the realm of proper economic inquiry; it is therefore typically
not addressed.
16 . See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, CITIZEN ACTION AND OTHER BIG IDEAS: A HISTORY OF
RALPH NADER AND THE MODERN CONSUMER MOVEMENT (1991), available at
http://www.nader.org/history/bollier chapter_2.html. Bollier's book
approvingly describes a group, the Center for the Study of
Commercialism,
dedicated to fighting not just individual acts and policies of
irresponsible businesses but the very culture of "mass
commercialism run amok." Michael F. Jacobson, founder and
executive director of Center for Science in the Public Interest,
decided it was time to confront the "buy till you die" ethic that
now invades every nook and cranny of American life and
corrodes our cultural life.
Id. The group's mission is "to combat Madison Avenue's advertising
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advertisers (and manufacturers) were characterized as
evil folk who created demand for products, services, or a
lifestyle that most people previously did not want, could
not afford and would not-or maybe should not-make
them happy even if they could afford it. To say that
preferences are in significant measure created rather than
discovered is not to ascribe to anyone the power to create
them.
Not that it needs to be said, but Schwartz is of course
not signing on to this type of criticism, nor is he signing on
to an alternate advertisers (and manufacturers)-are-evil
criticism: that people really do want the things the
advertisers are trying to sell them but that the advertisers
are evil for depicting the things so attractively because
people should not want them-say, because they cannot
afford them or should be less focused on acquisition and
more on other-regarding pursuits (and the manufacturers
are evil for making the things in the first place).
Interestingly, a related argument has made inroads
against smoking. Ads directed to minority communities
arguing that to smoke is to be a dupe to the majority
community's manufacturers and advertisers have had
some success, as have ads, directed to young people,
arguing that to smoke is to be a dupe to corporate
America.17
barrage (3,000 messages a day) and to encourage a simpler lifestyle,
moderate consumption and civic involvement." Id. According to the
founder of the group, and Professor Ronald K. L. Collins of Catholic
University Law School: "[t]oday's marketers promote artificial and
obsessional wants, urge ceaseless spending, foster a disposable society,
and inject commercialism into every facet of our lives .... All of this
treads on our moral and civic tradition like a bulldozer in a flower
garden." Id.
A search on Amazon.com for books with "Madison Avenue" in the title
yields The Messiah of Madison Avenue, by Patrick Cunningham. The
site's description of the book begins with the following: "Tracer Wolf is
the hottest name on Madison Avenue. Flashy, dynamic, brilliant, and
totally amoral." Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/Messiah-
Madison-Avenue-Patrick-Cunningham/dp/0595317448/ref=sr 1 1?
ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1208729065&sr=1-1 (last visited, Apr. 20,
2008).
17 .See Carrie McLaren, How Tobacco Company "Anti-Smoking" Ads
Appeal to Teens, STAY FREE!, Summer 2000,
http://www.stayfreemagazine. org/archives/17/tobacco-anti-
smoking.html ("The underlying message of the campaign is that, far
from symbolizing freedom and adulthood, tobacco use is a form of
obedience-obedience to tobacco companies."); Social Marketing
Institute, Success Stories: Florida "Truth" Campaign, http://www.social-
750 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
3. SOME THINGS WE CAN SAY ABOUT PREFERENCE
CONSTRUCTION
What can we say affirmatively about preference
construction? In a companion piece, I discuss the matter
in detail. Here, I stress only three features of my account.
First, people often make choices based on something
other than the inherent attributes of what they choose
and do not choose. People often choose things based on
what "sort of things the things are"-this perfume is the
sort of thing glamorous people wear, eating a low-fat diet
and exercising is the sort of thing people who live a
healthy lifestyle do, donating to this charity is the sort of
thing civic-minded people do, etc. Thus, even if one's
preferences for glamour, a healthy lifestyle and civic
mindedness are fixed, what one will choose is not fixed at
all. Considerable effort is spent by private and public
parties to change our views on the specifics of these
matters. Consider in this regard the following example.
Type into Google the search terms "car" and "male
menopause" and see what comes up. One typical search
result follows:
[A] wife realised something was badly wrong when the
headlights of her husband's car hit the kitchen wall at knee-
level instead of waist-level one evening. He had sold the Volvo
and bought a red, open-topped sports car. (Apparently over
80% of such cars are sold to sad sacks who believe this
throbbing mechanical extension makes them look young and
virile not old and desperate.) 18
How did these types of cars come to connote youth
and virility? Might it have been otherwise? Might it come
to be otherwise, especially if environmental concerns
come more to the forefront?
Second, we have more choices to make than we have
time to obtain "complete" (or perhaps even "sufficient")
information 19 to make them. For many choices, especially
those of comparatively little consequence, having a
decision-making strategy makes far more sense than
having some pre-existing preference menu that we would
marketing.org/success/cs-floridatruth.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
18. Amanda Craig, Male Menopause, http://www.amandacraig.com/
pages/journalism /features/malemenopause.htm (last visited, Apr. 20,
2008).
19 . It is not at all clear what information would be complete or
sufficient for just about any choice. Still, for present purposes, what is
meant is clear enough.
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have to consult. The strategy can take many forms: make
the most or least expensive choice, pick something
different each time, pick the thing that takes the least
time to acquire, pick the thing that's available at the store
where I like the people, pick randomly, etc. It can also be
a strategy about strategies: I will spend no more than x
amount of time making a relatively unimportant (however
defined) decision. Note that the case for preferring a
strategy over a pre-existing menu is even stronger than
the preceding argument makes it seem: often, there is no
pre-determined choice set about which one could make
inquiries. ° In some of the paradigmatic contexts that
Schwartz is concerned with-a trip to the supermarket, for
instance-assuming the existence of such a choice set
works well enough. But in many other important contexts
it does not. I discussed this issue in a previous article:
One example comes from an article in The New York Times by
Virginia Postrel, a prominent libertarian thinker. A justification
for affirmative action, she says, is that people choose not
among all possible alternatives but among the "evoked set,"
which is necessarily a subset of the full set. They are hence
more likely to choose a member of the evoked set. After
discussing this phenomenon in the context of toothpaste,
Postrel extends it to affirmative action. She notes that a
previous article in The New York Times had given very short
shrift to the African-American action movie stars Will Smith and
Wesley Snipes. According to Postrel,
The evoked set of action "stars" didn't overlap with the
evoked set of "black movie stars." There was no racial
hostility at work, just the limits of human minds and the
categories they create.21
Third, making choices is not a meta-process-some
straightforward means to the "end" of making the choice.
The process of "obtaining information" is implicitly
assumed to be far more tractable than it is. But in many
cases, the process is quite complicated. How would one
decide whether to donate to charity and if so, which
charity to choose? The potential considerations are
enormous and hard to assess. It is not just that the choice
20 Claire A. Hill, Beyond Mistakes: The Next Wave of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 563, 581-83 (2004) (discussing the
conceit that there are pre-existing choice sets, and some of the
consequences the conceit leads to).
21 . Id. (quoting Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene: The Lessons of the
Grocery Shelf Also Have Something to Say About Affirmative Action,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at C2).
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set is not pre-determined-the problem is far more
profound. There is no mechanical means of proceeding;
moreover, it will be necessary to stop before acquiring
"complete" information (and at some point that is hard to
characterize ex ante-when does one have "enough"
information?). When I seek to purchase something
fungible, I compare prices for x period of time. My sister
compares prices for 10x period of time. How did either of
us arrive at our methods for price comparison? Also, after
my comparisons, I do not second guess my decision; my
sister does. In Schwartz's terminology, I satisfice and she
maximizes. This suggests that the process itself is of
import and note, and is itself amenable to appraisal. And
the appraisal is not just as to how good the process is at
helping one "find what one wants." Rather, it is a more
ephemeral and hard-to-pin-down assessment, focused on
the choice and the process by which the choice was
made, and the interaction between the two. There are all
sorts of ancillary effects to be taken into account. One is
regret, a great concern of Schwartz's. Indeed, in this
regard, it has been demonstrated that some people will
have regrets if the outcome is bad, regardless of the
process by which the outcome came to be. Others might
not regret a bad outcome so long as the process was
sound. If I buy what I think is the best widget after doing
some research but later find out there was a better (on
some relevant metric) one available, will I regret my
choice? If the process I used was sound (as I assess
soundness), I might not regret my choice if I am in the
latter category. Moreover, insofar as there is no pre-
determined sense that there is a "discovery" potentially
to be made at some point, process itself becomes even
more important. If Smith will be applying a decision rule to
a relatively inconsequential decision (for instance,
choosing ketchup at the grocery store), he may be best
off if he can use some decision rule that is ready at hand
(buy the name brand that's cheapest) rather than having
to construct a more tailored one when confronted with an
elaborate array of choices. The chance that Smith would
be so much happier with the time-intensive choice than
with the choice based on the ready-at-hand decision rule
that it would warrant his additional time expenditure is
small.
Fourth, the choice process implicates how we view
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ourselves and how others might view us. What do
potential contracting partners think when I ask first to
discuss the clauses that cover the dissolution of the
venture we are proposing to set up? What kind of person
am I to consider whether to spend my bonus on a deluxe
mattress when people are starving in Ruritania?
What follows? First, that the case for as much choice
as possible is decidedly more measured once we
acknowledge how people choose, and how they do not
choose-that they do not choose by consulting "pre-
existing free standing preference menus. ' 22 What people
do in making choices is part discovery (having tried
oysters, I now know I like them and may get them again)
and part creation (I will be more inclined to get oysters
because I like to think of myself as, and to be thought of
as, an adventurous eater and I believe oyster-eating will
help me achieve this). Given positive and significant
information costs, even if all choices were "discoveries"
we might be worse off with too many choices. That
choices are also creations that could have been otherwise
makes the case all the stronger.
None of this is to suggest that any particular
regulatory policy prescription follows. That being said, my
arguments and Schwartz's views are clearly consistent
with an important component of the literature on
libertarian or "new" paternalism, 23 which seeks to justify
to libertarians regulatory interventions in certain
traditionally paternalistic spheres. In my companion
article, I argue that even though the justification may
ultimately not work, the new paternalists may
nevertheless come to the right conclusions. The
justification ultimately turns on the assumption that we
can determine what people "really want"-that they really
want, for instance, to forsake short-term pleasure (for
instance, eating a calorie-laden meal) for long-term
rewards (health and longer life). We cannot make this
determination, but neither can we make the
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental
Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217 (1993); Hill, supra note 13, at 705 n.57. There
may be sophisticated ways to map strategies onto some form of
preference menu. The mapping would yield something unwieldy and
very hard to use; even some economists might prefer to concede the
point in the face of such a massive assault on much-vaunted
methodological parsimony.
23 See, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5.
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determination the neoclassical economists make, that
what we really want is what we actually do-in this
example, eat the large meal. Because there is no clear
way for law to respect what people really want, trying to
do so ought not to trump other legitimate aims. 24
4. CONCLUSION
Barry Schwartz's argument in the Paradox of Choice
potentially raises serious difficulties for neoclassical
economists. To ordinary mortals, however, it is
overwhelmingly intuitive. Fidelity's mutual funds
webpage reads: "Browse Fidelity Funds. More than 175
ways to help you build a diversified portfolio."2 5 No listing
of the funds follows, of course. A graphic underneath
illustrates the selection process, breaking down the
decision into small, manageable chunks. And a good
thing too. Not just for the obvious reason-that Fidelity
knows its funds better than you do. Rather, it is because
the incremental value of more choice may very well be
smaller than the associated benefit, especially when
information costs, opportunity costs, and other ancillary
costs, such as the potential for regret, are taken into
account. Indeed, Schwartz's account underscores that
choosing isn't just a simple process of discovery. When
we choose, we do many other things as well: we may find
out about ourselves, convey information to others, set
ourselves up for good or bad feelings down the line (my
fund did well-I am savvy or lucky; my fund did badly-I
am a financial dolt or unlucky) and potentially, actions
based thereon. In sum, a thorough cost/benefit
calculation will not always favor more choice.
24 Hill, supra note 13, at 731.
25 Fidelity.com, Browse Available Mutual Funds,
http://personal.fidelity.
com/products/funds/content/WhatYouCanBuy/browseall funds.shtml.cv
sr?refpr=mfrt33 (last visited May 13, 2008).
